Strategy-proof Provision of Two Public Goods: the Lexmax Extension

This paper studies the problem of providing two public goods for agents with single-peaked preferences. A decision rule selects two points on the segment [0,1] for the public goods for every profile of reported preferences. Agents compare public good pairs by the lexmax ordering over pairs induced by their singlepeaked preference over single locations. We derive implications of strategyproofness in this setting and compare them with those in the model with one public good and in the model with two public goods under the max extension. We characterize the class of decision rules satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity and continuity with respect to preferences .W e also characterize subclasses of rules that satisfy additional properties.

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