Evolution and Breakdown of Trust in Continuous Time

Scholars have long studied trust and what creates trusting behavior, generally with an aim to increasing trust and capturing the efficiency gains that are likely to result. How does trust come about, how is it sustained, and when does it break down? Amnon Rapoport and Ryan O. Murphy address these questions in the context of a general trust game that evolves over time. The game they present has the potential to explore elements of trust not captured by the games that researchers have used in the past. Amnon Rapoport is Distinguished Professor of Management at the University of California Riverside’s School of Business Administration. He is one of the pioneers of experimental and behavioral methods in decision science. Ryan O. Murphy is Professor and Chairperson of decision theory and behavioral game theory at ETH Zürich. His research focuses on human decision making in both individual and strategic contexts.

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