Some Simple Tests of Rational Voting and Agenda Setting

This article analyzes election data that permit simple tests of rational voting and agenda setting. The voting test pertains to aggregate election results. The prediction is that when voters have single-peaked preferences, there will be more opposition to the second of two budget proposals that are voted on simultaneously. Unlike the standard binary choice setting, not all voters have weakly undominated voting strategies, but the game among the voters can be solved simply by iterative application of weak dominance. The agenda-setting prediction tested is that agenda setters should make one proposal rather than two when given the option. The data come from Oregon school district financial elections from 1980–83, years in which the rules for these elections were abruptly changed.

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