论文信息 - A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem - 字舞流文

A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem

We characterize the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem using the axioms of outcome efficiency, budget balance, equal treatment of equals, Pareto indifference, together with a weakening of strategy-proofness, upward-invariance.

Youngsub Chun | Manipushpak Mitra | Suresh Mutuswami | Y. Chun | Manipushpak Mitra | Suresh Mutuswami

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