Auction protocols

Vincent Conitzer Duke University 16.1 Standard Single-Item Auction Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-2 16.2 Valuations and Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-3 16.3 Strategic Bidding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-3 Solving the First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction • Solving the Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction 16.4 Revenue Equivalence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-5 16.5 Auctions with Different Revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-6 16.6 Complementarity and Substitutability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-7 16.7 Combinatorial Auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-8 16.8 The Winner Determination Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-9 General-Purpose Winner Determination Algorithms • Special-Purpose Winner Determination Algorithms 16.9 The Generalized Vickrey Auction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-11 16.10 Collusion and False-Name Bidding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-12 16.11 Computationally Efficient Truthful Combinatorial Auctions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-13 16.12 Iterative Combinatorial Auctions and Preference Elicitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-14 16.13 Additional Topics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-15 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-16

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