Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976

This study attempts to explain the recurring empirical observation that initiators of interstate disputes, both those that escalated into wars and those that ended otherwise, are disproportionately likely to win. Two competing models are developed: (1) The capability model argues that the outcome of the dispute is a function of the balance of capabilities among the protagonists and that the strongest prevails. (2) The resolve model argues that dispute outcomes are determined by the balance of motivation and resolve among the protagonists; that is, the actor with the highest level of resolve is likely to win. A random sample of 164 disputes is used to test these two models. The findings suggest that capabilities are unrelated to dispute outcomes, whereas resolve variables are consistently related to dispute outcomes. The implications for conflict management and conflict escalation are discussed.

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