Binary choices in small and large groups: A unified model

Two different ways to model the diffusion of alternative choices within a population of individuals in the presence of social externalities are known in the literature. While Galam’s model of rumors spreading considers a majority rule for interactions in several groups, Schelling considers individuals interacting in one large group, with payoff functions that describe how collective choices influence individual preferences. We incorporate these two approaches into a unified general discrete-time dynamic model for studying individual interactions in variously sized groups. We first illustrate how the two original models can be obtained as particular cases of the more general model we propose, then we show how several other situations can be analyzed. The model we propose goes beyond a theoretical exercise as it allows modeling situations which are relevant in economic and social systems. We consider also other aspects such as the propensity to switch choices and the behavioral momentum, and show how they may affect the dynamics of the whole population.

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