2-out-of-2 Rational Secret Sharing in Extensive Form

The empty threat is not credible, because the actions are taken simultaneously. To eliminate the empty threat, a non-simultaneous channel is used in this paper. Zhifang Zhang \cite{zzf1} proposes a 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing in extensive form to eliminate the empty threats while she does not consider the cost when neither players broadcast their shares and uses simultaneous channels in $Norm(k)$. In this paper we give a 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing in extensive form without simultaneous broadcast channel. Furthermore, we add the reputation effect into the model which influences the probability of the other player's choice. We punish the player who does not send his share after receiving the other player's share. Under the hypocrite strategy, there exists a sequential equilibrium in the extensive game which means that no players can gain higher payoffs after any histories as long as other player insists on the specified strategy.