论文信息 - Weighted Constrained Egalitarianism in TU-Games

Weighted Constrained Egalitarianism in TU-Games

The constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) for TU-games is extended to asymmetric cases, using the notion of weight systems as in Kalai and Samet (1987,1988). This weighted constrained egalitarian solution is based on the weighted Lorenz-criterion as an inequality measure. It is shown that in general there is at most one such weighted egalitarian solution for TU-games. Existence is proved for the class of convex games. Furthermore, the core of a postive valued convex game is covered by weighted constrained egalitarian solutions.

Maurice Koster | Maurice Koster

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