Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt

[1]  R. C. Merton,et al.  On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates , 1974, World Scientific Reference on Contingent Claims Analysis in Corporate Finance.

[2]  Philip H. Dybvig,et al.  Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity , 1983, Journal of Political Economy.

[3]  S. P. Mason,et al.  Contingent Claims Analysis of Corporate Capital Structures: An Empirical Investigation , 1984, World Scientific Reference on Contingent Claims Analysis in Corporate Finance.

[4]  A. Rubinstein.  The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under "Almost Common Knowledge" , 1989 .

[5]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities , 1990 .

[6]  X. Vives.  Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities , 1990 .

[7]  D. Scharfstein,et al.  A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law , 1991 .

[8]  Ken Binmore,et al.  Frontiers of game theory , 1993 .

[9]  H. Carlsson,et al.  Global Games and Equilibrium Selection , 1993 .

[10]  H. Carlsson,et al.  Equilibrium selection in stag hunt games , 1993 .

[11]  Suresh M. Sundaresan,et al.  Design and Valuation of Debt Contracts , 1994 .

[12]  H. Leland..  Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure , 1994, World Scientific Reference on Contingent Claims Analysis in Corporate Finance.

[13]  Walter N. Torous,et al.  A comparison of financial recontracting in distressed exchanges and chapter 11 reorganizations , 1994 .

[14]  Eduardo S. Schwartz,et al.  A Simple Approach to Valuing Risky Fixed and Floating Rate Debt , 1995 .

[15]  Patrick Bolton,et al.  Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors , 1996, Journal of Political Economy.

[16]  S. Morris,et al.  Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks" American Economic Review , 1996 .

[17]  Stephen Morris,et al.  A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks , 1998 .

[18]  Asian financial crisis , 1998 .

[19]  D. Duffie,et al.  Modeling term structures of defaultable bonds , 1999 .

[20]  S. Fischer.  On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort , 2000 .

[21]  Christina E. Metz,et al.  Private and Public Information in Self-fulfilling Currency Crises , 2002 .

[22]  Itay Goldstein,et al.  Demand Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs , 2002 .

[23]  M. Crouhy,et al.  A comparative analysis of current credit risk models , 2000 .

[24]  S. Morris,et al.  Global Games: Theory and Applications , 2001 .

[25]  J. Krahnen,et al.  Corporate Debt Restructuring: Evidence on Lending Coordination in Financial Distress , 2001 .

[26]  T. Jackson.  The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law , 2001 .

[27]  A structural model of corporate bond pricing with co-ordination failure , 2002 .

[28]  Currency Crises and Uncertainty About Fundamentals , 2002, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[29]  Christian Hellwig,et al.  Public Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.

[30]  Currency Crises and Uncertainty about Fundamentals , 2002 .

[31]  F. Hubert,et al.  Coordination Failure with Multiple-Source Lending, the Cost of Protection Against a Powerful Lender , 2002 .

[32]  Frank Heinemann,et al.  Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency , 2002 .

[33]  X. Vives,et al.  Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right after All? , 2002 .

[34]  Lars Peter Hansen,et al.  Advances in economics and econometrics: the eighth world congress , 2003 .

[35]  Nikola A. Tarashev,et al.  Currency Crises and the Informational Role of Interest Rates , 2003 .