Social stereotypes and judgments of individuals: An instance of the base-rate fallacy

Abstract Social stereotypes may be defined as beliefs that various traits or acts are characteristic of particular social groups. As such, stereotypic beliefs represent subjective estimates of the frequencies of attributes within social groups, and so should be expected to “behave like” base-rate information within the context of judgments of individuals: specifically, individuating target case information should induce subjects to disregard their own stereotypic beliefs. Although the results of previous research are consisten with this prediction, no studies have permitted normative evaluation of stereotypic judgments. Because the hypothesis equates base rates and stereotypes, normative evaluation is essential for demonstrating equivalence between the base-rate fallacy and neglect of stereotypes in the presence of individuating case information. Two experiments were conducted, allowing for normative evaluation of effects of stereotypes on judgments of individuals. The results confirmed the hypothesis and established the generalizability of the effect across controversial and uncontroversial, socially desirable and socially underirable stereotypic beliefs. More generally, an examination of the differences between intuitive and normative statistical models of the judgment task suggest that the base-rate fallacy is but one instance of a general characteristic of intuitive judgment processes: namely, the failure to appropriately adjust evaluations of any one cue in the light of concurrent evaluations of other cues.

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