Discounted Mean-Field Game model of a dense static crowd with variable information crossed by an intruder

It has been proven that the displayed anticipation pattern of a dense crowd crossed by an intruder can be successfully described by a minimal Mean-Field Games model. However, experiments show that when pedestrians have limited knowledge, the global anticipation dynamics becomes less optimal. Here we reproduce this with the same MFG model, with the addition of only one parameter, a discount factor $\gamma$ that tells the time scale of agents' anticipation. We present a comparison between the discounted MFG and the experimental data, also providing new analytic results and important insight about how the introduction of $\gamma$ modifies the model.

[1]  Alexandre Nicolas,et al.  Anticipating Collisions, Navigating in Complex Environments, Elbowing, Pushing, and Smartphone-Walking: A Versatile Agent-Based Model for Pedestrian Dynamics , 2022, 2211.03419.

[2]  C. Appert-Rolland,et al.  Pedestrians in static crowds are not grains, but game players. , 2022, Physical review. E.

[3]  Cécile Appert-Rolland,et al.  Mechanical response of dense pedestrian crowds to the crossing of intruders , 2018, Scientific Reports.

[4]  Denis Ullmo,et al.  Quadratic mean field games , 2017, Physics Reports.

[5]  P. Lions,et al.  The Master Equation and the Convergence Problem in Mean Field Games , 2015, 1509.02505.

[6]  Ioannis Karamouzas,et al.  Universal power law governing pedestrian interactions. , 2014, Physical review letters.

[7]  Diogo A. Gomes,et al.  Mean Field Games Models—A Brief Survey , 2013, Dynamic Games and Applications.

[8]  Alain Bensoussan,et al.  The Master equation in mean field theory , 2014, 1404.4150.

[9]  D. Gomes,et al.  Mean Field Games Models—A Brief Survey , 2013, Dynamic Games and Applications.

[10]  Pierre-Louis Lions,et al.  Long Time Average of Mean Field Games with a Nonlocal Coupling , 2013, SIAM J. Control. Optim..

[11]  R. Carmona,et al.  Probabilistic Analysis of Mean-Field Games , 2012, SIAM J. Control. Optim..

[12]  Marie-Therese Wolfram,et al.  On a mean field game approach modeling congestion and aversion in pedestrian crowds , 2011 .

[13]  T. Kanda,et al.  Social force model with explicit collision prediction , 2011 .

[14]  P. Lions,et al.  Jeux à champ moyen. II – Horizon fini et contrôle optimal , 2006 .

[15]  P. Lions,et al.  Jeux à champ moyen. I – Le cas stationnaire , 2006 .

[16]  Peter E. Caines,et al.  Large population stochastic dynamic games: closed-loop McKean-Vlasov systems and the Nash certainty equivalence principle , 2006, Commun. Inf. Syst..

[17]  Serge P. Hoogendoorn,et al.  Pedestrian route-choice and activity scheduling theory and models , 2004 .

[18]  Helbing,et al.  Social force model for pedestrian dynamics. , 1995, Physical review. E, Statistical physics, plasmas, fluids, and related interdisciplinary topics.

[19]  René Carmona,et al.  Probabilistic Analysis of Mean-field Games , 2013 .