IMPACT OF AGENCY RISKS AND TASK UNCERTAINTY ON VENTURE CAPITALIST-CEO INTERACTION

This study examined the impact of agency risks and task uncertainty on venture capitalist-chief executive officer (VC-CEO) interaction. Results from 51 VC-CEO dyads indicate that the frequency of interaction depends on the extent of VC-CEO goal congruence, the degree of the CEO's new venture experience, the venture's stage of development, and the degree of technical innovation it is pursuing. However, contrary to conventional expectations, the degree of management ownership had no impact on the frequency of interaction.

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