Evaluation Methodology for Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems: An Overview.

This paper provides an overview of the methodology approach developed by the Generation IV International Forum Expert Group on Proliferation Resistance & Physical Protection for evaluation of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection robustness of Generation IV nuclear energy systems options. The methodology considers a set of alternative systems and evaluates their resistance or robustness to a collection of potential threats. For the challenges considered, the response of the system to these challenges is assessed and expressed in terms of outcomes. The challenges to the system are given by the threats posed by potential proliferant States and sub-national adversaries on the nuclear systems. The characteristics of the Generation IV systems, both technical and institutional, are used to evaluate their response to the threats and determine their resistance against the proliferation threats and robustness against sabotage and theft threats. System response encompasses three main elements: (1) System Element Identification. The nuclear energy system is decomposed into smaller elements (subsystems) at a level amenable to further analysis. (2) Target Identification and Categorization. A systematic process is used to identify and select representative targets for different categories of pathways, within each system element, that actors (proliferant States or adversaries) might choose to use ormore » attack. (3) Pathway Identification and Refinement. Pathways are defined as potential sequences of events and actions followed by the proliferant State or adversary to achieve its objectives (proliferation, theft or sabotage). For each target, individual pathway segments are developed through a systematic process, analyzed at a high level, and screened where possible. Segments are connected into full pathways and analyzed in detail. The outcomes of the system response are expressed in terms of PR&PP measures. Measures are high-level characteristics of a pathway that include information important to the evaluation methodology users and to the decisions of a proliferant State or adversary. They are first evaluated for segments and then aggregated for complete pathways. Results are aggregated as appropriate to permit pathway comparisons and system assessment. The paper highlights the current achievements in the development of the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Evaluation Methodology. The way forward is also briefly presented together with some conclusions.« less

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