TOWARDS A THEORY OF WORK INTENSITY

There is a conflict of interest between workers and firms over the intensity of labor effort. The labor market may fail, or simply be too costly, as a mechanism for resolving this conflict, and so nonmarket allocative mechanisms embedded in the institutional arrangements of shopfloor governance serve this purpose. Future research should focus on worker voice mechanisms and the behavior of supervisors and informal work groups in order better to understand labor effort outcomes. Which sorts of institutional arrangements result in efficient labor effort also requires further research. Evidence suggests that existing institutional arrangements may be neither the most efficient possible or even efficiency enhancing compared to formerly existing arrangements.

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