DEPEND-HRA - A method for consideration of dependency in human reliability analysis

A consideration of dependencies between human actions is an important issue within the human reliability analysis. A method was developed, which integrates the features of existing methods and the experience from a full scope plant simulator. The method is used on real plant-specific human reliability analysis as a part of the probabilistic safety assessment of a nuclear power plant. The method distinguishes dependency for pre-initiator events from dependency for initiator and post-initiator events. The method identifies dependencies based on scenarios, where consecutive human actions are modeled, and based on a list of minimal cut sets, which is obtained by running the minimal cut set analysis considering high values of human error probabilities in the evaluation. A large example study, which consisted of a large number of human failure events, demonstrated the applicability of the method. Comparative analyses that were performed show that both selection of dependency method and selection of dependency levels within the method largely impact the results of probabilistic safety assessment. If the core damage frequency is not impacted much, the listings of important basic events in terms of risk increase and risk decrease factors may change considerably. More efforts are needed on the subject, which will prepare the background for more detailed guidelines, which will remove the subjectivity from the evaluations as much as it is possible.

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