Space Debris Removal: A Game Theoretic Analysis

Space Debris Removal: A Game Theoretic Analysis Richard Klima 1, Daan Bloembergen1, Rahul Savani1, Karl Tuyls1, Daniel Hennes2 and Dario Izzo 3 1 University of Liverpool, UK, email: {richard.klima, d.bloembergen, rahul.savani, k.tuyls}@liverpool.ac.uk 2 DFKI, Bremen, Germany, email: daniel.hennes@dfki.de 3 European Space Agency, Noordwijk, NL, email: dario.izzo@esa.int Academic Editor: name Version August 2, 2016 submitted to Games; Typeset by LATEX using class file mdpi.cls Abstract: We analyse active space debris removal efforts from a strategic, game-theoretical perspective. 1 Space debris are non-manoeuvrable, human-made objects orbiting Earth, which pose a significant threat to 2 operational spacecraft. Active debris removal missions have been considered and investigated by different 3 space agencies with the goal to protect valuable assets present in strategic orbital environments. An active 4 debris removal mission is costly but has a positive effect for all satellites in the same orbital band. This leads 5 to a dilemma: each agency is faced with the choice between the individually costly action of debris removal, 6 which has a positive impact on all players; or wait and hope that others jump in and do the ‘dirty’ work. The 7 risk of the latter action is that, if everyone waits the joint outcome will be catastrophic, leading to what in game 8 theory is referred to as the ‘tragedy of the commons’. We introduce and thoroughly analyse this dilemma using 9 empirical game theory and a space debris simulator. We consider two and three player settings and investigate 10 the strategic properties and equilibria of the game, and find that the cost/benefit ratio of debris removal strongly 11 affects the game dynamics. 12

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