MobilePACE - Password Authenticated Connection Establishment implementation on mobile devices

Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) ist eine Beschreibungssprache zur Definition von Datenstrukturen. Die Domain-Parameter und die verwendeten bzw. unterstützten kryptographischen Protokolle sind auf dem elektronischen Personalausweis in der Datei EF.CardAccess abgelegt und in ASN.1 kodiert. Für die Ausführung des PACE Protokolls muss diese Datei ausgelesen werden und die benötigten Informationen extrahiert werden. Paket: de.tud.cdc.mecca.asn1 • de.tud.cdc.mecca.asn1.ECDHAlgorithmIdentifier Der Algorithm Identifier bzw. die Domain-Parameter für elliptische Kurven sind in dieser Klasse implementiert. Dabei werden die jeweiligen Informationen bzw. Werte aus der Datei EF.CardAccess extrahiert. • de.tud.cdc.mecca.asn1.TLV Die Daten im EF.CardAccess sind im TLV-Format (Type, Length, Value) gespeichert. Die Klasse implementiert das Kodieren und Dekodieren des TLV-Formats. Paket: de.tud.cdc.mecca.asn1.eac • de.tud.cdc.mecca.asn1.eac.ISecurityInfo Die Klasse definiert eine Schnittstelle für alle SecurityInfos. • de.tud.cdc.mecca.asn1.eac.SecurityInfo Diese Klasse bildet eine einzelne SecurityInfo ab, bestehend aus dem Object Identifier des Protokolls und den dazugehörigen benötigten bzw. optionalen Daten [3, Kapitel A.1]. SecurityInfo ::= SEQUENCE { protocol OBJECT IDENTIFIER, requiredData ANY DEFINED BY protocol, optionalData ANY DEFINED BY protocol OPTIONAL } • de.tud.cdc.mecca.asn1.eac.SecurityInfos Die Klasse repräsentiert eine Menge der einzelnen SecurityInfos und vereint alle in der EF.CardAccess vorhandenen SecurityInfos. Die Klasse implementiert folgende ASN.1 Datenstruktur [3, Kapitel A.1]. SecurityInfos ::= SET OF SecurityInfo Paket: de.tud.cdc.mecca.asn1.eac.pace • de.tud.cdc.mecca.asn1.eac.pace.PACEDomainParameterInfo Die Klasse implementiert folgende ASN.1 Datenstruktur: PACEDomainParameterInfo ::= SEQUENCE { protocol OBJECT IDENTIFIER(id-PACE-DH | id-PACE-ECDH), domainParameter AlgorithmIdentifier, parameterId INTEGER OPTIONAL } Zum Zugriff auf die Daten stehen die Methoden getProtocol(), getDomainParameter() und getParameterId() zur Verfügung. Mit Hilfe der Methode isPACEObjectIdentifer(DERObjectIdentifier o) lässt sich überprüfen, ob der gegebene Object Identifer ein PACE Object Identifer der Form id-PACE-DH oder id-PACE-ECDH ist.

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