An Extended Interpreted System Model for Epistemic Logics

The interpreted system model offers a computationally grounded model, in terms of the states of computer processes, to S5 epistemic logics. This paper extends the interpreted system model, and provides a computationally grounded one, called the interpreted perception system model, to those episternic logics other than S5. It is usually assumed, in the interpreted system model, that those parts of the environment that are visible to an agent are correctly perceived by the agent as a whole. The essential idea of the interpreted perception system model is that an agent may have incorrect perception or observations to the visible parts of the environment and the agent may not be aware of this. The notion of knowledge can be defined so that an agent knows a statement iff the statement holds in those states that the agent can not distinguish (from the current state) by using only her correct observations. We establish a logic of knowledge and certainty, called KC logic, with a sound and complete proof system. The knowledge modality in this logic is S4 valid. It becomes S5 if we assume an agent always has correct observations; and more interestingly, it can be S4.2 or S4.3 under other natural constraints on agents and their sensors to the environment.

[1]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Knowledge, Certainty, Belief, and Conditionalisation (Abbreviated Version) , 1994, KR.

[2]  Joseph Y. Halpern Reasoning about uncertainty , 2003 .

[3]  Joseph Y. Halpern,et al.  Modeling Belief in Dynamic Systems, Part II: Revisions and Update , 1999, J. Artif. Intell. Res..

[4]  Wiebe van der Hoek,et al.  Systems for Knowledge and Belief , 1993, J. Log. Comput..

[5]  Michael Wooldridge,et al.  A Computationally Grounded Logic of Visibility, Perception, and Knowledge , 2001, Log. J. IGPL.

[6]  Joseph Y. Halpern,et al.  A Guide to Completeness and Complexity for Modal Logics of Knowledge and Belief , 1992, Artif. Intell..

[7]  Alessio Lomuscio,et al.  Deontic Interpreted Systems , 2003, Stud Logica.

[8]  Frans Voorbraak,et al.  The Logic of Objective Knowledge and Rational Belief , 1990, JELIA.

[9]  Richard Spencer-Smith,et al.  Modal Logic , 2007 .

[10]  Jaakko Hintikka,et al.  Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions. , 1965 .

[11]  W. van der Hoek,et al.  Epistemic logic for AI and computer science , 1995, Cambridge tracts in theoretical computer science.

[12]  Joseph Y. Halpern,et al.  A little knowledge goes a long way: knowledge-based derivations and correctness proofs for a family of protocols , 1992, JACM.

[13]  Leandro Chaves Rêgo,et al.  Interactive unawareness revisited , 2005, Games Econ. Behav..

[14]  R. Labrecque The Correspondence Theory , 1978 .

[15]  Joseph Y. Halpern,et al.  The complexity of reasoning about knowledge and time , 1986, STOC '86.

[16]  Saul A. Kripke,et al.  Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I Normal Modal Propositional Calculi , 1963 .

[17]  Michael Wooldridge,et al.  Computationally grounded theories of agency , 2000, Proceedings Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems.

[18]  Ronald Fagin,et al.  Reasoning about knowledge , 1995 .

[19]  Max J. Cresswell,et al.  A New Introduction to Modal Logic , 1998 .

[20]  Guido Governatori,et al.  A computationally grounded logic of knowledge, belief and certainty , 2005, AAMAS '05.