The Governance of the New Enterprise

The changing nature of the corporation forces us to re-examine much of what we take for granted in corporate governance. What precisely is the entity that is being governed? How does the governance system obtain power over it, and what determines the division of power between various stakeholders? And is the objective of allocating power only to enhance the returns of outside investors? In this paper we argue that, given the changing nature of the firm, the focus of corporate governance must shift from alleviating the agency problems between managers and shareholders to studying mechanisms that give the firm the power to provide incentives to human capital. We also provide some examples of the kind of subjects that should now be the main focus of study in corporate governance.

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