Towards a Privacy-Preserving National Identity Card

In this paper, we propose to replace the national identity card, currently used in many countries, by a personal device that allows its user to prove some binary statements about himself while minimizing personal information leakage. The privacy of the user is protected through the use of anonymous credentials which allows him to prove binary statements about himself to another entity without having to disclose his identity or any unnecessary information. The proposed scheme also prevents the possibility of tracing the user, even if he proves several times the same statement (unlinkability property). A tamper-proof smartcard is used to store the personal information of the user thus protecting his privacy and preventing the risks of forgery at the same time. The user identifies himself to the card via biometrics thus forbidding an unauthorized use in the situation where the card is stolen or lost. Two practical implementations of the privacy-preserving identity card are described and discussed.

[1]  Herbert Burkert,et al.  Some Preliminary Comments on the DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. , 1996 .

[2]  Victor Shoup,et al.  Why Chosen Ciphertext Security Matters , 2000 .

[3]  Fabrice Boudot.  Partial revelation of certified identity , 2000, CARDIS.

[4]  Silvio Micali,et al.  Proofs that yield nothing but their validity or all languages in NP have zero-knowledge proof systems , 1991, JACM.

[5]  Markulf Kohlweiss,et al.  P-signatures and Noninteractive Anonymous Credentials , 2008, TCC.

[6]  David Chaum,et al.  Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete , 1985, CACM.

[7]  Martin Wattenberg,et al.  A fuzzy commitment scheme , 1999, CCS '99.

[8]  Amit Sahai,et al.  Efficient Non-interactive Proof Systems for Bilinear Groups , 2008, EUROCRYPT.

[9]  Nalini K. Ratha,et al.  Enhancing security and privacy in biometrics-based authentication systems , 2001, IBM Syst. J..

[10]  Amit Sahai,et al.  Pseudonym Systems , 1999, Selected Areas in Cryptography.

[11]  Srivaths Ravi,et al.  Tamper resistance mechanisms for secure embedded systems , 2004, 17th International Conference on VLSI Design. Proceedings..

[12]  Sébastien Canard,et al.  Low-Cost Cryptography for Privacy in RFID Systems , 2006, CARDIS.

[13]  Boris Skoric.  Security with Noisy Data - (Extended Abstract of Invited Talk) , 2010, Information Hiding.

[14]  D. Birch,et al.  Psychic ID: A blueprint for a modern national identity scheme , 2008 .

[15]  Amit Sahai,et al.  Pseudonym Systems (Extended Abstract) , 2000 .

[16]  Jan Camenisch,et al.  A Signature Scheme with Efficient Protocols , 2002, SCN.

[17]  Ronald Cramer,et al.  A Practical Public Key Cryptosystem Provably Secure Against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack , 1998, CRYPTO.

[18]  Jan Camenisch,et al.  An Efficient System for Non-transferable Anonymous Credentials with Optional Anonymity Revocation , 2001, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[19]  Ingrid Verbauwhede,et al.  Side-channel issues for designing secure hardware implementations , 2005, 11th IEEE International On-Line Testing Symposium.

[20]  Jan Camenisch,et al.  A Cryptographic Framework for the Controlled Release of Certified Data , 2004, Security Protocols Workshop.

[21]  Yevgeniy Dodis,et al.  Fuzzy Extractors A Brief Survey of Results from 2004 to 2006 , 2008 .

[22]  David Chaum,et al.  Group Signatures , 1991, EUROCRYPT.