Model-Driven Information Flow Security for Component-Based Systems

This paper proposes a formal framework for studying information flow security in component-based systems. The security policy is defined and verified from the early steps of the system design. Two kinds of non-interference properties are formally introduced and for both of them, sufficient conditions that ensures and simplifies the automated verification are proposed. The verification is compositional, first locally, by checking the behavior of every atomic component and then globally, by checking the inter-components communication and coordination. The potential benefits are illustrated on a concrete case study about constructing secure heterogeneous distributed systems.

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