Endogenous information acquisition in supply chain management

In this paper, we analyze an endogenous determination of efforts put into information acquisition and its impact on supply chain management. More specifically, we consider a supplier who sells a product to a buyer during a single selling season. Prior to placing an order with the supplier, the buyer has an option to acquire additional information about the demand by hiring experts (who are capable of providing forecasts). Because a commission fee must be paid to each hired expert, there exists a tradeoff between the cost and the value of the information, and the buyer needs to determine how much information to acquire. We derive the optimal information-acquisition level in an integrated setting and compare it with that determined in a decentralized setting. We also analyze several types of supply contracts to examine if they can coordinate the supply chain and allow an arbitrary division of system profit between the supplier and the buyer.

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