论文信息 - An exploration of reputation formation in experimental games

An exploration of reputation formation in experimental games

This paper presents results from experiments with finitely repeated games with complete and incomplete information. We use two treatment variables: the number of rounds the game is played and the value of the probability that reflects the presence of incomplete information.

Jordi Brandts | Neus Figueras | J. Brandts | Neus Figueras

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