Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal

Recent experimental research has revealed surprising patterns in people's intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. One limitation of this research, however, is that it has been conducted exclusively on people from Western cultures. The present paper extends previous research by presenting a cross-cultural study examining intuitions about free will and moral responsibility in subjects from the United States, Hong Kong, India and Colombia. The results revealed a striking degree of cross- cultural convergence. In all four cultural groups, the majority of participants said that (a) our universe is indeterministic and (b) moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism. The question of free will is one of the oldest and most intractable in the history of Western philosophy; philosophers are still arguing about how best to answer it. But recent experimental research on the topic has arrived at a surprising result. Although philosophers remain divided about how to address the question of free will, it seems that a substantial majority of ordinary people have somehow converged on a single basic view. What's more, they seem to embrace a thesis—usually called incompatibilism—that most philosophers are prone to reject. Even while this research is suggestive, it suffers from an important limitation—all of the studies have been conducted on subjects in the United States. This opens up the possibility that the existing results merely reflect some idiosyncratic property of contemporary Western culture. To address this worry, we conducted a cross- cultural study of intuitions about free will. Our aim was to determine whether previous results merely pointed to some aspect of one particular culture or whether these results really were pointing to some more fundamental truth about the way people think about human freedom.

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