A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations

Summary. We present a family of mechanisms which implement Lindahl allocations in Nash equilibrium. With quasilinear utility functions this family of mechanisms are supermodular games, which implies that they converge to Nash equilibrium under a wide class of learning dynamics.

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