A rough set-based game theoretical approach for environmental decision-making: A case of offshore oil and gas operations

Abstract Environmental decision-making in offshore oil and gas (OOG) operations can be extremely complex due to conflicting objectives or criteria, availability of vague and uncertain information, and interdependency among multiple decision-makers. Most existing studies ignore conflicting preferences and strategic interactions among decision-makers. This paper presents a game theoretical approach to solve multi-criteria conflict resolution problem under constrained and uncertain environments. Uncertainties in the quantification of imprecise data are expressed using rough numbers. A multi-criteria game is developed to model a decision problem in which three groups of decision-makers (i.e., operators, regulators and service engineers) are involved. This game is solved using the generalized maximin solution concept. With the solution (i.e., optimal weights of the criteria), the rough numbers can be aggregated to an expected payoff for each alternative. Finally, the weights of upper and lower limits of a rough number are employed to transform the expected payoff into a crisp score, based on which all alternatives are ranked to identify the best one. A numerical example is outlined to demonstrate the application of the proposed method to the selection of management scenarios of drilling wastes.