论文信息 - On the Oligopolistic Extraction of Non-renewable Common-Pool Resources

On the Oligopolistic Extraction of Non-renewable Common-Pool Resources

In recent literature the extraction of common-pool resources ha s been discussed under the aspect of whether or not they can be used efficiently when a finite number of agents has access to the resource. The objective of this paper is the derivation of a necessary equilibrium condition in a simple model. This condition has severe consequences for existence propositions in papers of M.C. Kemp and N.V. Long_(1980), J. McMillan and H.W. Sinn_(1984), and J.F. Reinganum and N.L. Stokey_(1985). Copyright 1986 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

Friedel Bolle | F. Bolle

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