Profit distribution and compensation structures in publicly and privately funded hybrid venture capital funds

Policy makers have become increasingly concerned at the lack of risk capital available to new and early-stage entrepreneurial ventures. As a public response to a perceived market failure, several governments have set up programs to channel equity finance to capital constrained but high potential, young enterprises. Critically, government support is often directed through the agency of private venture capital funds. We examine the profit distribution and compensation structures used in these hybrid public/private funds. We appraise government policy makers' ability to use these structures to improve the expected returns in market failure areas in order to attract private sector investors and professional managers to participate in these funds. The results derived from our simulation study suggest that such asymmetric profit sharing models can only resolve relatively modest market failures unless the programs also manage to attract highly competent investors who are able to produce above average gross returns in market failure areas.

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