The architecture of robust publishing systems

The Internet in its present form does not protect content from censorship. It is straightforward to trace any document back to a specific Web server, and usually directly to an individual. As we discuss below, there are valid reasons for publishing a document in a censorship-resistant manner. Unfortunately, few tools exist that facilitate this form of publishing. We describe the architecture of robust systems for publishing content on the Web. The discussion is in the context of Publius, as that system meets the most design goals of currently deployed systems. Publius has the property that it is very difficult for any adversary to censor or modify the content. In addition, the identity of the publisher is protected once the content is posted. The system differs from others in that tools are provided for updating or deleting published content, and users can browse the content in the normal point-and-click manner using a standard Web browser and a client-side proxy.

[1]  Madhu Sudan,et al.  Highly Resilient Correctors for Polynomials , 1992, Inf. Process. Lett..

[2]  Hugo Krawczyk,et al.  Secret Sharing Made Short , 1994, CRYPTO.

[3]  염흥렬,et al.  [서평]「Applied Cryptography」 , 1997 .

[4]  Paul F. Syverson,et al.  Proxies for anonymous routing , 1996, Proceedings 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference.

[5]  David Chaum,et al.  Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms , 1981, CACM.

[6]  John Beidler,et al.  Data Structures and Algorithms , 1996, Wiley Encyclopedia of Computer Science and Engineering.

[7]  R. Anderson.  The Eternity Service , 1996 .

[8]  Andrew V. Goldberg,et al.  Towards an archival Intermemory , 1998, Proceedings IEEE International Forum on Research and Technology Advances in Digital Libraries -ADL'98-.

[9]  Nathaniel S. Borenstein,et al.  MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) Part One: Mechanisms for Specifying and Describing the Format of Internet Message Bodies , 1992, RFC.

[10]  Roger Dingledine,et al.  The Free Haven Project: Distributed Anonymous Storage Service , 2000, Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability.

[11]  Ian Clarke,et al.  Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System , 2000, Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability.

[12]  Robert Ellis Smith,et al.  Ben Franklin's Web Site: Privacy and Curiosity from Plymouth Rock to the Internet , 2000 .

[13]  Moni Naor,et al.  Pricing via Processing or Combatting Junk Mail , 1992, CRYPTO.

[14]  Alfred V. Aho,et al.  Data Structures and Algorithms , 1983 .

[15]  Andrew V. Goldberg,et al.  A prototype implementation of archival Intermemory , 1999, DL '99.

[16]  Russ Bubley,et al.  Randomized algorithms , 1995, CSUR.

[17]  Yossi Matias,et al.  Consistent, yet anonymous, Web access with LPWA , 1999, CACM.

[18]  Dieter Gollmann,et al.  Computer Security , 1979, Lecture Notes in Computer Science.

[19]  Ronald L. Rivest,et al.  The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm , 1992, RFC.

[20]  James F. Doyle,et al.  Peer-to-Peer: harnessing the power of disruptive technologies , 2001, UBIQ.

[21]  David A. Wagner,et al.  TAZ Servers and the Rewebber Network: Enabling Anonymous Publishing on the World Wide Web , 1998, First Monday.

[22]  Matt Bishop,et al.  What Is Computer Security? , 2003, IEEE Secur. Priv..

[23]  Rajeev Motwani,et al.  Randomized Algorithms , 1995, SIGA.

[24]  Michael K. Reiter,et al.  Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions , 1998, TSEC.

[25]  Andreas Rieke,et al.  Securing the anonymity of content providers in the World Wide Web , 1999, Electronic Imaging.

[26]  Andy Oram,et al.  Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Power of Disruptive Technologies , 2001 .

[27]  Adi Shamir,et al.  How to share a secret , 1979, CACM.