Ergonomic challenges for digitization: learning from analog mission planning processes

This article aims to consider the conventional, analog, mission planning process with the objective of identifying the decision making constraints and challenges for digitization. Prototypes of digital mission planning systems are beginning to be devised and demonstrated, but there has been concern expressed over the design of such systems which fail to understand and incorporate the human aspects of socio-technical systems design. Previous research has identified many of the potential pitfalls of failing to take Human Factors considerations into account as well as the multiplicity of constraints acting on the planners and planning process. An analysis of mission planning in a Battle Group is presented, based on an observational study by the authors. This study illustrates the efficiency of an analog process which has evolved over many generations to form the Combat Estimate, a process that is mirrored by forces throughout the world. The challenges for digitization include ensuring that the mission planning process remains easy and involving, preserving the public nature of the products, encouraging the collaboration and cooperation of the planners, and maintaining the flexibility, adaptability and speed of the analog planning process. It is argued that digitization should not become an additional constraint on mission planning. 2 The International C2 Journal | Vol 4, No 3 Introduction to mission planning Mission failure is often thought to be the result of poor mission planning (Levchuk et al. 2002), which places considerable demands on the planners and the planning process. This observation is further confounded by the two general principles of warfare. The first principle is that of the “fog of war” (i.e., the many uncertainties about the true nature of the environment, Clausewitz 1832) and second the principle that “no battle plan survives contact with the enemy” (i.e., no matter how thorough the planning is, the enemy is unlikely to be compliant and may act in unpredictable ways, von Moltke n.d.). These three factors (i.e., the effects of uncertainty, the enemy, and failure on mission planning) require the planning process to be robust, auditable, and flexible. Mission planning has to be a continuous, iterative and adaptable process, optimizing mission goals, resources, and constraints (Levchuck 2002). Roth et al. (2006) argue that the defining characteristic of command and control is the continual adaptation to a changing environment. Constant change in the goals, priorities, scale of operations, information sources, and systems being used means that the planning systems need to be extremely adaptable to cope with these changes. According to Klein and Miller (1999) there are many constraints acting on mission planning, including scarcity of resources, time pressure, uncertainty of information, availability of expertise, and the structure of the tasks to be undertaken. Mission planning requires knowledge of the domain, objects in the domain and their relationships as well as the constraints acting on the domain, the objects and their relations (Kieweit et al. 2005). They also note that the planning cycles can range from a couple of hours to a few days depending upon the complexity of the situation and the time available. Given all of the constraints acting on the planning process and the need for the plan to be continually revised and modified in light of the enemy actions and changing situation, Klein and Miller (1999) argue that “simpler plans might allow better implementation and easier modification” STANTON ET AL. | Challenges For Digitization 3 (Ibid., 219). This point is reinforced by Riley et al. (2006) who assert that “plans need to be simple, modifiable, flexible, and developed so that they are quickly and easily understood” (Ibid., 1143). Mission planning is an essential and integral part of battle management. Although there are some differences within and between the armed services (and the coalition forces) in the way they go about mission planning, there are also some generally accepted aspects that all plans need to assess. These invariants include: enemy strength, activity and assumed intentions, the goals of the mission, analysis of the constraints in the environment, the intent of the commander, developing courses of action, choosing a course of action, identifying resource requirements, synchronizing the assets and actions, and identifying control measures. A summary of the planning process for the United States Army may be found in Riley et al. (2006) and the Canadian Army may be found in Prefontaine (2002). Their description has much in common with land-based planning in the British Army, which is described in The Combat Estimate booklet (UK MoD 2007). Observation of Mission Planning in a Battle Group The mission planning process has been observed by the authors at the Land Warfare Centre at Warminster in the United Kingdom and on training exercises in Germany. The observations at Warminster have been both as participant-observers and as normal observers. The processes observed describe UK doctrine only, although there are some parallels with planning doctrine in other nations. In the case study described in this article, the authors undertook direct observations of the planning processes, sitting in the planning cell within the Battle Group Head Quarters while recording the actions of staff officers and photographing the products that they produced. When time permitted they asked questions of clarification directly to the staff officers. All of the authors were Human Factors researchers whom were well versed in Human Factors methods (Stanton et al. 4 The International C2 Journal | Vol 4, No 3 2005). The findings from the study, as presented in this article, were presented back to the staff officers at the end of the exercises to check that the interpretations were valid. Therefore, this research may be considered to be an exploratory study of the traditional (non-digital) planning processes. This article is based upon single case study research of an exercise in Germany, an approach used previously by researchers exploring the military planning process (Klein and Miller 1999; Riley et al. 2006; Roth et al. 2006). This is a recognized approach within Human Factors with numerous researchers developing methodologies describing the process of developing theory from case study research. Glaser and Strauss outline Grounded Theory (1967), a method based around constant comparison of data and theory, highlighting the emergence of theoretical categories solely from evidence. Additionally, researchers such as Eisenhardt (1989) have developed processes to validate the development of theory from case study research as well as arguing the benefits of such a research stance. Eisenhardt (1989) argues that such theory building is more likely to develop novel theory; more likely to develop testable theory with readily measurable constructs; and more likely to develop empirically valid theory as it is so intimately tied to evidence. This section describes the observed activities in the planning process following a Warning Order received from Brigade. For the purpose of this analysis, only the conventional materials (whiteboards, maps, overlays, paper, flip charts and staff officers’ notebooks) were examined. As Figure 1 shows, the planning is undertaken in a public environment where various people contribute and all can view the products. This public nature of the products is particularly useful at the briefings, which encourages collaboration and cooperation. It also helps to focus the planners’ minds on the important issues and the command intent. STANTON ET AL. | Challenges For Digitization 5 Figure 1. Battle Group Head Quarters – Public Planning Area (G5) The following vignette describes how a Battle Group Head Quarters was observed to conduct itself in the planning process. While other Battle Group Head Quarters might vary, the basic themes are likely to be similar in the processes they follow and products they produce. Warning Order from Brigade arrived The Warning Order (WO) arrived and was handed to the Chief of Staff (CoS) who read the whole document first, highlighting relevant material for himself and the Company level. 6 The International C2 Journal | Vol 4, No 3 Chief of Staff creates Company Warning Order The WO was too detailed for Company level, so some editing by CoS was necessary, as well as the inclusion of some additional material to clarify the anticipated task requirements. Send Warning Order to Companies The modified and edited WO was then sent to the companies below the Battle Group, so that they would have advanced notice of the intention of the orders when they arrived. This gives them an opportunity to prepare in advance of the actual orders. Create planning timeline The CoS created a planning timeline for the production of a plan to defeat an assault team that had parachuted into their area. There were 2 hours available to construct the plan (from 1300 to 1500), which allotted approximately 17 minutes per question (of the Combat Estimate’s 7 questions) as shown in Appendix Figure 1. The planning timeline was drawn on a flip chart. The Combat Estimate is a planning process that has been developed over decades and is described in more detail in The Combat Estimate book issued by the Command and Staff Trainer organization at the Land Warfare Centre in Warminster, UK (2007). The Combat Estimate has 7 main questions to guide planners through the process, namely: Q1. What is the enemy doing and why? Q2. What have been I told to do and why? Q3. What effects do I want to have on the enemy and what direction must I give to develop my plan? STANTON ET AL. | Challenges For Digitization 7 Q4. Where can I best accomplish each action/effect? Q5. What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect? Q6. Where and when do each of the actions take place in relation to each other? Q7. 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