Security Analysis of EMV Channel Establishment Protocol in An Enhanced Security Model

The EMV chip-and-pin system is one of the most widely used cryptographic system in securing credit card and ATM transactions. As suggested by the EMV consortium, the existing RSA-based EMV system will be upgraded to Elliptic Curve Cryptography ECC based system. In CCS 2013, Brzuska et al. made the first step to analyze the security of the ECC-based EMV channel establishment protocol in a channel establishment security model, and showed that a slightly modified version of the protocol meets the intended security goals. In this paper, we continue this strand of research by analyzing the security of the ECC-based EMV protocol in a strong channel establishment security model which allows the adversary to get ephemeral private keys of the involved parties. We find that the original protocol is not secure in our security model because the adversary can impersonate a Card entity. Then we slightly modify the protocol almost with no addition of computation cost and show that the resulting protocol is secure in our security model under standard cryptographic assumptions.

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