Time-Dependent Strategies in Games of Timing

Timing, a central aspect of decision-making in security scenarios, is a subject of growing academic interest; frequently in the context of stealthy attacks, or advanced persistent threats (APTs). A key model in this research landscape is FlipIt [1]. However, a limiting simplifying assumption in the FlipIt literature is that costs and gains are not subject to discounting, which contradicts the typical treatment of decision-making over time in most economically relevant contexts.

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