An open transmission access (OTA) establishes that all market participants have the same right to access the system facilities but restricted to the physical constraints (security levels, congestion, etc.). The market participants are responsible for the costs incurred for the usage to accommodate the transactions. However, charging the users in a fair way is still a problem that needs to be resolved. A concomitant problem is how to construct the scheme to charge the users for the transmission loss incurred during the transmission. In this paper, a cooperative game theory is utilized to model transmission loss cost allocation. The Aumann-Shapley methodology of the cooperative game theory is employed for the transmission loss cost allocation in the open transmission access environment. Numerical examples to illustrate the application of the methodology are presented and discussed. The simulation results show the desirable properties one may demand of a loss allocation scheme.
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