Central banking, monetary policies, and the implications for transition economies

I: Introduction. Central Banking and Monetary Policies: Major Issues and Implications for Transition Economies M.I. Blejer, M. Skreb. II: Central Bank Independence. Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policy J.A. Frenkel. Central Banking in a Democratic Society: Implications for Transition Countries F.S. Mishkin. Central Bank Independence and the Political Business Cycle: A Critical Re-examination A. Drazen. Political Culture and the Political Economy of Central Bank Independence A. Hillman. III: Defining Central Bank Functions. Central Banking and Economic Development M.J. Fry. IV: Central Banks and Financial Soundness. Central Banks, Asset Bubbles, and Financial Stability G.G. Kaufman. The Conduct of Monetary Policy and Banking Soundness: A Slovenian Episode V. Bole. V: Disinflation and the Role of Nominal Targets. Monetary Policy Strategies for Disinflation: Lessons from Recent Experiences in Transition Economies and Israel G. Bufman, L. Leiderman. VI: Currency Crises and Capital Controls. Speculative Attacks and Capital Mobility C. Wyplosz. Nascent Capital Flows, Learning and Chilean-type Controls M. Selowski, R. Martin. The Role of the Central Banks in the Capital Account Liberalization: Case of Croatia V. Sonje. VII: Currency Boards. Some Reflections about Currency Boards S.H. Hanke. The Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Its History and its Issues W. Coats. VIII: EMU and Transition Economies. The International Impact of the Euroland and its Implications for Transition Countries R.A. Mundell. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy of Transition Economies of Central and Eastern Europe after the Launch of EMU P.A. Masson.

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