UN Conventions, Technology and Retaliation in the Fight Against Terrorism: An Econometric Evaluation

For rational terrorists, an increase in the cost of one mode of operation will induce substitutions into other modes. Co‐operative international efforts to thwart terrorism are hampered by incentives on the part of governments to renege. Our findings are consistent with these observations: the use of metal detectors reduced skyjackings but increased other kinds of hostage taking incidents. International agreements have had no discernible impacts on terrorism. After a surge in terrorist activity following the US bombing of Libya, there was a sustained reduction in resource‐using terrorist incidents. During this period, terrorists substituted into threat and hoax incidents; such incidents require few inputs. In the final assessment, the raid did not curb terrorism.

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