A Type System for Privacy Properties

Mature push button tools have emerged for checking trace properties (e.g. secrecy or authentication) of security protocols. The case of indistinguishability-based privacy properties (e.g. ballot privacy or anonymity) is more complex and constitutes an active research topic with several recent propositions of techniques and tools. We explore a novel approach based on type systems and provide a (sound) type system for proving equivalence of protocols, for a bounded or an unbounded number of sessions. The resulting prototype implementation has been tested on various protocols of the literature. It provides a significant speed-up (by orders of magnitude) compared to tools for a bounded number of sessions and complements in terms of expressiveness other state-of-the-art tools, such as ProVerif and Tamarin: e.g., we show that our analysis technique is the first one to handle a faithful encoding of the Helios e-voting protocol in the context of an untrusted ballot box.

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