论文信息 - Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units

Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units

This paper characterizes serial mechanisms for the cost sharing of an excludable public good that is available in multiple units. We show that serial mechanisms are the only voluntary mechanisms that satisfy coalition strategy-proofness and consumer sovereignty.

Yan Yu | Yan Yu

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