Control of insurance fraud in Nigeria: an exploratory study (case study)

Purpose – Insurance fraud as a global economic problem threatens the financial strength of insurers and threatens the survival of the insurance institution. The purpose of this paper is to explore the magnitude of the problem including the industry's and regulatory authority's responses in tackling the menace in Nigeria. The paper is motivated by the recent effort on the part of the Nigerian regulatory authority to strengthen the sector through consolidation. Such renewed vigour on part of Nigeria is geared towards fighting all forms of economic crimes in both public and private sectors in post‐military years.Design/methodology/approach – The paper reviews the literature on the existing fraud control mechanisms, i.e. insurance contract design and auditing and the perception of fraud by customers in the insurance market. A survey is conducted by interview method to explore the size of the problem and the effectiveness of the approach the industry and its regulator are adopting to control it.Findings – The ...

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