The Sealed-Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study*

[1]  V. Smith,et al.  Theory and individual behavior of first-price auctions , 1988 .

[2]  Roy Radner,et al.  Equilibria of the Sealed- Bid Mechanism for Bargaining with Incomplete Information*, ' , 1987 .

[3]  Andrew Schotter,et al.  Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study , 1987, Journal of Political Economy.

[4]  Joyce E. Berg,et al.  Controlling Preferences for Lotteries on Units of Experimental Exchange , 1986 .

[5]  Kalyan Chatterjee,et al.  Bargaining under Incomplete Information , 1983, Oper. Res..

[6]  M. Satterthwaite,et al.  Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading , 1983 .

[7]  A. Roth,et al.  THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN BARGAINING: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY' , 1982 .

[8]  Matthew L. Spitzer,et al.  The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests , 1982, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[9]  Roger B. Myerson,et al.  Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..

[10]  Vernon L. Smith,et al.  Bidding and Auctioning Institutions: Experimental Results , 1976 .

[11]  H. B. Drury.  The Labor Policy of the Shipping Board , 1921, Journal of Political Economy.

[12]  Dan Alger,et al.  Laboratory Tests of Equilibrium Predictions with Disequilibrium Data , 1987 .

[13]  V. Smith.  Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science , 1982 .

[14]  Robert M. Townsend,et al.  Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information , 1981 .

[15]  Louis L. Wilde.  ON THE USE OF LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS IN ECONOMICS , 1981 .

[16]  R. Myerson.  Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem , 1979 .

[17]  Y. Amihud,et al.  Bidding and Auctioning for Procurement and Allocation , 1979 .

[18]  A. Roth,et al.  Game-Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining , 1979 .