Signal Structure-Based Authentication for Civil GNSSs: Recent Solutions and Perspectives

A key aspect to be considered in the design of new generations of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals and receivers is a proper partition between system and receiver contribution to the robustness against spoofing attacks. This article maps the current threats and vulnerabilities of GNSS receivers and presents a survey of recent defenses, focusing on cryptographic solutions suitable to authenticate civil signals. Future perspectives and trends are analyzed, with particular emphasis on spreading code authentication techniques, considered as a key innovation for the next generation of civil GNSS signals. An assessment of the robustness and feasibility of the various presented solutions is also provided, analyzing in particular the impact on both current and future receivers.

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