Monitoring Internet Censorship with UBICA

Censorship is becoming increasingly pervasive on the Internet, with the Open Net Initiative reporting nearly 50 countries practicing some form of censorship. Previous work has reported the existence of many forms of Internet censorship (e.g., DNS tampering, packet filtering, connection reset, content filtering), each of which may be composed to build a more comprehensive censorship system. Automated monitoring of censorship represents an important and challenging research problem, due to the continually evolving nature of the content that is censored and the means by which censorship is implemented. UBICA, User-based Internet Censorship Analysis, is a platform we implemented to solve this task leveraging crowdsourced data collection. By adopting an integrated and multi-step analysis, UBICA provides simple but effective means of revealing censorship events over time. UBICA has revealed the effect of several censorship techniques including DNS tampering and content filtering. Using UBICA, we demonstrate evidence of censorship in several selected countries (Italy, Pakistan, and South Korea), for which we obtained help from local users and manually validated the automated analysis.

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