On the relation between counterfactual and causal reasoning

Abstract We critique the distinction Byrne makes between strong causes and enabling conditions, and its implications, on both theoretical and empirical grounds. First, we believe that the difference is psychological, not logical. Second, we disagree that there is a strict “dichotomy between the focus of counterfactual and causal thoughts.” Third, we disagree that it is easier for people to generate causes than counterfactuals.

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