Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments

Abstract. Tournaments are complete and asymmetric binary relations. This type of binary relation rules out the possibility of ties or indifferences which are quite common in other contexts. In this work we generalize, from a normative point of view, some important tournament solutions to the context in which ties are possible.

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