Towards an eclectic theory of the internet commons

Recent developments in communications technologies and, in particular, the advent of the Internet and its widespread applications in all spheres of human activity, have posed a serious challenge to the mainstream neo-institutional theory of the commons (common goods) and, especially, common pool resources theory (CPR). Although the term ‘new commons’ has been coined to describe a new area of study, previous attempts to analyze Internet goods within the framework of CPR theory have not been successful, as they have not been able to capture the important new characteristics of the Internet commons. Based upon an empirical analysis of over 20 Internet goods, the current author proves that, basically, Internet goods do not fall within the common pool category of goods. In addition to the key characteristics used so far within mainstream theory - excludability and substractability, other attributes such as sharing potential, joint use in production rather than in consumption only, and non-hierarchical governance of production definitely are relevant, and should be included in any analysis of Internet commons. This analysis has proven that the neoinstitutional approach retains its explanatory power with respect to the Internet commons, especially by emphasizing the path-dependent evolution of the Internet and the role of informal and formal rules shaping its operating environment. At the same time, it does not capture the direct impact of major breakthroughs in information and telecommunication technologies (ICT) on the Internet commons. The proposed eclectic framework, one which addresses the specific features of Internet goods, allows to grasp the full complexity of the Internet commons. It integrates new concepts developed in various disciplines of social sciences (economics, sociology, history, anthropology) with the mainstream theory of the commons, developed from the neo-institutional perspective. Among those new concepts and theories, the most important are general purpose technologies (GPT), network externalities, positive free riding, the concept of shareable goods, the architecture of participation, peer production, and the gift economy.

[1]  Elinor Ostrom,et al.  Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource , 2003 .

[2]  Andrea Saveri and Howard Rheingold and Kathi Vian.  Technologies of Cooperation , 2005 .

[3]  Howard Rheingold,et al.  The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier , 2000 .

[4]  Ilya Prigogine,et al.  Order out of chaos , 1984 .

[5]  Sidney C. Sufrin,et al.  The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. , 1966 .

[6]  Yochai Benkler,et al.  Coase's Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm , 2001, ArXiv.

[7]  Jakub Nowak,et al.  Henry Jenkins, "Kultura konwergencji. Zderzenie starych i nowych mediów", tłum. M. Bernatowicz, M. Filiciak, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2007, s. 283 [recenzja] , 2007 .

[8]  Steven Weber,et al.  The Success of Open Source , 2004 .

[9]  E. Ostrom,et al.  Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources , 1994 .

[10]  Yochai Benkler,et al.  The wealth of networks: how social production transforms markets and freedom , 2006 .

[11]  N. Smelser,et al.  NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL , 2003 .

[12]  P. Samuelson.  The Pure Theory of Public Expanditure , 1954 .

[13]  W. Powell,et al.  The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis , 1993 .

[14]  David D. Clark,et al.  Rethinking the design of the Internet , 2001, ACM Trans. Internet Techn..

[15]  R. Coase.  The Nature of the Firm , 1937 .

[16]  Yochai Benkler,et al.  From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access , 2000 .

[17]  H. Demsetz,et al.  Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization , 1975, IEEE Engineering Management Review.

[18]  D. North.  Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance: Economic performance , 1990 .

[19]  Christian Sandvig.  An initial assessment of cooperative action in Wi-Fi networking , 2004 .

[20]  Charlotte Hess.  Is There Anything New Under the Sun?: A Discussion and Survey of Studies on New Commons and the Internet , 2000 .

[21]  Stan J. Liebowitz,et al.  The Fable of the Keys , 1990, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[22]  Elinor Ostrom,et al.  A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons , 2007 .

[23]  Steven Weber.  The Political Economy of Open Source Software , 2000 .

[24]  Richard R. Nelson,et al.  Bringing institutions into evolutionary growth theory , 2002 .

[25]  Mark A. Lemley,et al.  The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era , 2000 .

[26]  Elinor Ostrom,et al.  Artifacts, Facilities, and Content: Information as a Common-Pool Resource , 2001 .

[27]  M. Olson,et al.  The Logic of Collective Action , 1965 .

[28]  Y BaldwinCarliss,et al.  The Architecture of Participation , 2006 .

[29]  J. Abbate,et al.  Inventing the Internet , 1999 .

[30]  J. M. Buchanan,et al.  An Economic Theory of Clubs , 1965 .

[31]  Grahame F. Thompson,et al.  Markets, Hierarchies and Networks: The Coordination of Social Life , 1991 .

[32]  C. Shapiro,et al.  Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility , 1985 .

[33]  G. Hardin.  The Tragedy of the Commons , 2009 .

[34]  Mark Fischetti,et al.  Weaving the web - the original design and ultimate destiny of the World Wide Web by its inventor , 1999 .

[35]  P. Kollock.  The Economies of Online Cooperation: Gifts and Public Goods in Cyberspace , 1999 .

[36]  E. Ostrom.  COPING WITH TRAGEDIES OF THE COMMONS , 1999 .

[37]  Anil Hira,et al.  The New Institutionalism Contradictory Notions of Change , 2000 .

[38]  M. Castells,et al.  The Hacker Ethic and the Spirit of the Information Age , 2001 .

[39]  E. Ostrom.  Understanding Institutional Diversity , 2005 .

[40]  Stephen E. Margolis,et al.  Network externality : an uncommon tragedy , 1994 .

[41]  R. Hinde,et al.  Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Collective Action , 2010 .

[42]  H. Gordon,et al.  The economic theory of a common-property resource: The fishery , 1954, Journal of Political Economy.

[43]  O. Williamson.  The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead , 2000 .