The nature of scientific evidence : statistical, philosophical, and empirical considerations

An exploration of the statistical foundations of scientific inference, "The Nature of Scientific Evidence" asks what constitutes scientific evidence and whether scientific evidence can be quantified statistically. Mark Taper, Subhash Lele, and an esteemed group of contributors explore the relationships among hypotheses, models, data, and inference on which scientific progress rests in an attempt to develop a new quantitative framework for evidence. Informed by interdisciplinary discussions among scientists, philosophers, and statisticians, they propose a new "evidential" approach, which may be more in keeping with the scientific method. "The Nature of Scientific Evidence" persuasively argues that all scientists should care more about the fine points of statistical philosophy because therein lies the connection between theory and data. Though the book uses ecology as an exemplary science, the interdisciplinary evaluation of the use of statistics in empirical research will be of interest to any reader engaged in the quantification and evaluation of data.

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