The possibility of mixed-strategy equilibria with constant-returns-to-scale technology under Bertrand competition
暂无分享,去创建一个
Abstract. We analyze the Nash equilibria of a standard Bertrand model. We show that in addition to the marginal-cost pricing equilibrium there is a possibility for mixed-strategy equilibria yielding positive profit levels. We characterize these equilibria and find that having unbounded revenues is the necessary and sufficient condition for their existence. Hence, we demonstrate that under realistic assumptions the only equilibrium is marginal-cost pricing.
[1] A note on Bertrand competition with asymmetric fixed costs , 1997 .
[2] C. Shapiro. Theories of oligopoly behavior , 1989 .
[3] Daniel F. Spulber. Bertrand competition when rivals' costs are unknown , 1995 .
[4] William W. Sharkey,et al. A Bertrand model of pricing and entry , 1993 .
[5] Augustin M. Cournot. Cournot, Antoine Augustin: Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses , 2019, Die 100 wichtigsten Werke der Ökonomie.