An Integrated-Utility Based Optimization in Multi-Issues Negotiation

In time-limited multi-issues negotiation among multi-Agents, the worst result is no trade-off. One of the most important factors contributing to the failure of the negotiation is that no agreement can be made in one of the negotiation-related issues. A multi-issues integrated utility evaluation mechanism is proposed firstly, and then an equal-utility exchange on the Agent's negotiation-related issues with a reserved value vector is given. This exchange makes use of the relationship between the utility of the Agent's negotiation-related issues. In order to get rid of the deadlock in one of the negotiation-related issues, the reserved value of the issue is adjusted. On the other hand, there is a mechanism to ensure the integrated-utility of the multi-issues exchange. In this way, the efficiency and the probability to get a trade-off are improved. An example is given to testify the optimization.