Cultural Barriers to Multinational C2 Decision Making

Abstract : National cultural differences present barriers to successful coalition command and control. The challenge is compounded by distributed decision making that characterizes many operations. If U.S. military personnel are to work effectively in coalition operations, they have to understand the complexities presented by national cultural differences. This paper reviews cultural differences that can disrupt situational awareness, decision making, coordination, and communication in multinational coalitions. These differences are in power distance, dialectical reasoning, counterfactual thinking, risk assessment, uncertainty management, and activity orientation. The authors propose a Cultural Lens concept that captures cultural differences in reasoning, judgment, and authority structure. A Cultural Lens is a metaphor to allow those involved in C2 operations to see their world as if through the eyes of other participants. They will understand how options are conceptualized and evaluated. This ability to decenter supports anticipation of actions, accurate judgments, and effective negotiation of differences. A Cultural Lens will strengthen common ground and the coordination of action. It aims at enhancing understanding, grounding training, and optimizing the design of decision support systems. As multinational coalitions account for more of military operations and Operations Other Than War (OOTW), national culture differences will need to be managed.

[1]  Emily S. Patterson,et al.  How Unexpected Events Produce An Escalation Of Cognitive And Coordinative Demands , 2001 .

[2]  Jonathan E. Butner,et al.  Compliance with a Request in Two Cultures: The Differential Influence of Social Proof and Commitment/Consistency on Collectivists and Individualists , 1999 .

[3]  M. Gelfand,et al.  Culture and Negotiator Cognition: Judgment Accuracy and Negotiation Processes in Individualistic and Collectivistic Cultures. , 1999, Organizational behavior and human decision processes.

[4]  Pierre R. Dasen,et al.  Human behavior in global perspective , 1999 .

[5]  R. Nisbett,et al.  Culture, dialectics, and reasoning about contradiction. , 1999 .

[6]  Philip E. Tetlock,et al.  Close-call counterfactuals and belief-system defenses: I was not almost wrong but I was almost right. , 1998 .

[7]  R. Helmreich,et al.  Culture at Work in Aviation and Medicine: National, Organizational and Professional Influences , 1998 .

[8]  David L. Hannaman,et al.  Methods to Improve Cultural Communication Skills in Special Operations Forces. , 1998 .

[9]  E. Salas,et al.  Individual and team decision making under stress: Theoretical underpinnings. , 1998 .

[10]  Eduardo Salas,et al.  Making decisions under stress: Implications for individual and team training. , 1998 .

[11]  David D. Woods,et al.  Communication of Intent in Distributed Supervisory Control Systems , 1997 .

[12]  Patricia M. Greenfield,et al.  Culture as process: Empirical methods for cultural psychology. , 1997 .

[13]  L. Mann,et al.  Differences between Australian and Japanese Students in Decisional Self-Esteem, Decisional Stress, and Coping Styles , 1993 .

[14]  G. Klein,et al.  Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods , 1993 .

[15]  H. Markus,et al.  Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. , 1991 .

[16]  C. Lumsden.  Culture and the Evolutionary Process, Robert Boyd, Peter J. Richerson. University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London (1985), viii, +301. Price $29.95 , 1986 .

[17]  G. Hofstede,et al.  Culture′s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values , 1980 .

[18]  A. Tversky,et al.  Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases , 1974, Science.

[19]  F. Strodtbeck,et al.  Variations in value orientations. , 1961 .