论文信息 - Club theory with a peer-group effect

Club theory with a peer-group effect

Abstract This paper analyses optimal and equilibrium club configurations in the presence of a peer-group effect. The model has two types of individuals (a's and b's), with the a's benefitting from the presence of the b's in their club. When the groups are mixed to take advantage of this peer- group effect, an efficiency loss results because public consumption can no longer be tailored to suit individual preferences. The normative analysis focuses on this trade-off and states conditions under which the optimal club structure (mixed versus homogeneous) can be identified. The equilibrium analysis makes use of a competitive-developer model to investigate the nature of equilibrium under a peer-group effect.

Jan K. Brueckner | Kangoh Lee

[1] Anita A. Summers,et al. Do Schools Make a Difference , 1977 .

[2] Richard Arnott,et al. Peer group effects and educational attainment , 1987 .

[3] Clubs as a case of competitive industry with goods of variable quality , 1980 .

[4] Local income redistribution: A club-theoretic analysis , 1989 .

[5] Peer group effects and educational production functions , 1978 .

[6] E. Berglas. Quantities, qualities and multiple public services in the Tiebout model , 1984 .

[7] Charles M. Tiebout. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures , 1956, Journal of Political Economy.

[8] E. Berglas,et al. On the Theory of Clubs , 1976 .

[9] E. Berglas,et al. Distribution of tastes and skills and the provision of local public goods , 1976 .

[10] M. Wooders,et al. Competitive equilibrium and the core in club economies with anonymous crowding , 1987 .

[11] D. Pinés,et al. CLUBS, LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSPORTATION MODELS A synthesis , 1981 .